https://www.canada.ca/en/air-force/services/history-heritage/battle-britain/monument.html
In today’s post, I welcome the first response to my own post calling out for historians to respond. The author is Rev. David Jones, LLB, MDiv, a recently retired clergy with a strong interest in English and Irish history. As you’ll see, his work is well researched.
Readers with little time will want to read the main argument. Those with more time will be rewarded by reading his back-up material.
Introduction:
It is challenging to find a precedent when all the points are presented emphasizing their differences from the past, e.g. destructive power, speed. So I thought “maybe that is the deception in the assignment – trying to find similarity using evidence/categories seemingly chosen because they had no such evidence.”
What if we look elsewhere, such as in any war’s immediate impact and consequences, i.e. seen not from the perspective of the powerful, but in the experience of the vulnerable. If the implicit purpose of the question was to answer a puzzle, “What should we be doing now?”, an historian’s perspective would inject the corollary, “What is the result if we don’t do it?” and, more deeply, “What is the result – for whom?”
The world view of the 1940’s and 1950’s recognized that war’s destruction, historically always horrible for the rank-and-file soldier, or for the overrun farm community or town, this thing called “war” would now be inflicted everywhere, and on everyone.
WW II introduced a holocaust deliberately murdering millions, widespread atrocities at a continental level, and, from the air, “fire-bombing” and nuclear bombs capable of destroying whole cities in one attack.
Twenty-five years earlier, WW I created a whole “lost generation”, as even hundreds of thousands of soldiers would be killed in a battle, and this repeated over and over, through four years of bloodshed.
In the final years of the 1950s people tired of planning home bomb shelters because they decided they did not want to come out of a shelter into a world that was only a wasteland. “Better to die and be done with it.” Slogans such as “win” and “survive” were not the same as to “live”.
The “Call-Out” doesn’t pose the challenge “How to have a successful strategy meeting.” That approach could imply a solution rests with the leaders: if they win the game, all’s fine. But if a 21st century crisis includes both sides, winner and loser, will suffer enormously, even catastrophically, that crisis cries out for a different discussion.
When technology leaders are building shelters for their own homes, that’s a warning; when they begin saying “shelters are not enough”, our conversation must change.
Any war is not just strategic competition; it’s gruesome, bloody, and tragic. The modern world has taken these horrors from the battlefield to being everywhere.
It is those people everywhere who will die, and who must take control of the debate. When leaders believe they alone are in charge, and don’t listen, history has a way of providing a correction: massive defeat in elections, being one example.
Precisely because war is potentially so more destructive (I include AI-type catastrophe),the main question to answer is not “how to….” It’s “who to.”
As I reflected, my mind turned to Northern Ireland. It is a special place for me. My maternal grandfather was born just outside of Belfast, in 1875. The family he was born into was Protestant, but among those with a very positive views of Roman Catholics, and “traditional” but confident in the potential of women’s role in public life, e.g. voting. At least one of my grandfather’s sisters married and moved to Dublin, raising a family there; and they were joined by her widowed father.
Generations later, Northern Ireland’s final 30 years of the 20th century were, especially for Belfast, an era of seemingly unrelenting anger and violence, with riots, bombings, and murders, all known as “The Troubles.”
My first awareness that long-term change could happen and was happening came when Canadian TV news, in the 1990’s, reported on a group of women, openly demonstrating in Belfast against a recent outbreak of sectarian threats and violence. “They are brave” I thought, “with counter-demonstrations or assaults being so possible.” Nonetheless, there they were – defiant – with a “we say it to any trouble-maker” attitude. Their message was that Belfast was going to be a safe home, for every child and adult.
“Aha. This may be the change. When the population are speaking up, when the young and the zealous see that the women will not tolerate violence, the proverbial balance may tip.”
I have learned that what I was watching that day was actually one moment in a long process of slow but determined, achieving peace.
At their core each step was an opportunity for developing trust, not merely advocating it. Two key methods were inclusion of other voices and that first mutual and resolute commitment to non-violence.
Simply put, hear from all that are affected and firmly stop what endangers us all.
For those with more time: A few caveats
Public involvement and leadership do not eliminate the role of planners, expert/experienced analysis and service personnel to manage/administer approved projects.
Strategic forethought can be understood as akin to common sense, essential security and ensuring reasonable prospects, for nations or our individual daily life; for example:
a) intelligence information – the need to have the best possible knowledge of what others may want to do, or can do, or could acquire the designs and material for actually doing. Military intelligence is sophisticated and secret in its detail, but the principal of “knowing” is also important in commerce, as in reading the fine print in a contract, or in personal choices, learning what the weather forecast is before taking a five-hour hike.
b) back-up plan – in the winter sport of curling, players value the “plan B” or “plan C” – if my shot is not perfect, what could it still accomplish/risk this way or that? A better road system assists commerce, but we can also use it for defence in realigning positions of our military personnel, if it follows a route, and is built, in a certain way.
c) reserves – money in a savings account can be used to pay for unexpected cost overruns, enable timely medical procedures for a family, or finance accelerated production of military/emergency systems and supplies, all “defences” that may prove to have enormous value.
d) “what if” – deliberately have on the team some who always seem to have a different perspective, who question assumptions and favour a new way or the old way when the majority are going in a different direction. This dissenting voice in the discussion may discern and be expressing the same approach your opponent/enemy or misfortune/lost opportunity is about to unleash.
e) “thought through” diligence – ideals or policy assertions dare not ignore the discipline of considering the several steps in any plan, how they connect or can go astray, how they may overreach or be inadequate. “Half-built but done” buildings or promises are a harsh judgment on plans high in ambition but woeful in worth.
None of these caveats contradicts the value of more voices at the table.
I believe they help to explain why relying on “just the usual insiders” is folly.
And now, an expanded look at lessons the Northern Ireland story includes:
Before highlights of the whole process, here are other points about the role of women:
At the Forum (see below): Secured two elected seats at the multi-party peace negotiations, despite facing institutional skepticism and hostility from male counterparts.
Core Issues: Championed social and community issues that main parties overlooked, including integrated education, mixed housing, victims” rights, and reconciliation.
Grassroots and Political Impact:
Community Resilience: Throughout the decades of conflict known as “The Troubles,” women built vital cross-community networks, ran support groups, and held fractured neighbourhoods together.
Reconciliation: Their advocacy directly shaped the language of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, helping ensure long-term stability and a successful public “Yes”
Global Precedent: The advocacy and inclusion of the NIWC directly helped inspire UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which mandates women’s equal participation in peace processes worldwide.
Delayed Recognition: While their contributions were initially met with derision or minimized during the 1998 talks, their legacy has been prominently spotlighted in subsequent milestone anniversaries and international peace forums.
Mo Mowlam: Served as the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, showing immense political courage by engaging directly with paramilitary prisoners and building trust across divided lines.
Civil Society Activists: Thousands of grassroots women across local communities organized regular consultations, bridged community divides, and maintained social cohesion when formal political talks threatened to collapse.
Political Leaders: Figures like Bríd Rodgers and Bairbre de Brún helped drive negotiations within their respective political parties.
Female participants confronted sexism and scorn, said McWilliams. “There was huge condescension. The title of my book is Stand Up, Speak Out because I was told on a regular basis to shut up and sit down. We did call it out before the #MeToo movement.”
Bríd Rodgers, a founding member of Social Democratic and Labour party who was part of the talks:
“We knew that leaving people out in the cold would cost us all a lot. Now we know the value added that women bring to the table.”
“Mo Mowlam was absolutely brilliant. She connected with ordinary people. She got the trust of the paramilitaries, she went into the Maze [prison]. She had a human touch and didn’t stand on ceremony. I’ve never met a politician like her. She was instrumental in setting an ambience that was conducive to reaching agreement. I don’t think her role was recognised at the time.”
Women also successfully lobbied to include clauses about victims’ rights and integrated education; said McWilliams. “We brought solutions when a lot of parties were bringing problems.”
Back-up material
Some of the many Northern Ireland peace stages (as listed from the internet):
The Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985
From the early 1980s onwards, the Governments of Ireland and Britain deepened their cooperation to achieve a durable political solution that would bring an end to the conflict. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was agreed by Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Hillsborough Castle. The Agreement formally recognised the right of the Government of Ireland to put forward views and proposals relating to non-devolved matters in Northern Ireland. This joint approach, underpinned by close working relationships at official and political level, became a hallmark of the moments of greatest progress in the peace process.
Relationships across and between the islands had also been bolstered by shared membership of the European Union, which provided a framework in which relationships could be deepened at all levels – from politicians exchanging ideas in the corridors of Brussels, to businesses across the island finding new ways to work with one another, made possible by our joint access to the Single Market. From 1995, the EU’s PEACE programmes gave a tangible manifestation of the enduring support in the European Union for peace and reconciliation on the island of Ireland.
Joint Declaration 1993
The two Governments issued the Downing Street Declaration, which set out a charter for peace and reconciliation on the island of Ireland. It established the principles of self-determination and consent in relation to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. This meant that it was up to the people of Northern Ireland to decide on its future status and this could not be imposed from the outside. The Declaration also gave those associated with paramilitary violence a route into the political process.
International Support
In 1994, following the ceasefires of IRA and Loyalist paramilitary organizations, a critical window of opportunity for further negotiations arose. These efforts were given vital support by international partners, with the United States in particular playing a unique role as an honest broker. In December 1995, Senator George Mitchell, who had been appointed by President Bill Clinton as a Special Adviser for Economic Initiatives in Ireland the year before, together with former Prime Minister of Finland, Harri Holkeri and General John de Chastelain of Canada, comprised an international body to independently assess the decommissioning of paramilitary arms. This body reported on progress in January 1996.
However, in February 1996, the IRA ended its ceasefire detonating a bomb in London’s docklands area that killed two people and injured many more.
Northern Ireland Women”s Coalition founded by Catholic academic Monica McWilliams and Protestant social worker Pearl Sager to contest elections to the Northern Ireland Forum, the body for all-party talks which led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. he creation of the NIWC is usually traced back to a meeting over dinner between Avrila Kilmurray, a former trade union official and former director of the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, and McWilliams in April 1996. The pair discussed ways in which women could be “written into, rather than out of” the Northern Ireland peace process. The party declined to take a position on whether Northern Ireland should be part of the United Kingdom or a United Ireland. It did not identify as feminist.
They did not win any constituency seats, but under a “top-up” mechanism to ensure the representation of minor parties, they were awarded two seats at the Forum.
May 1996, elections to the proposed NORTHERN IRELAND FORUM and all-party negotiations were held across Northern Ireland.
The Multi-Party Talks
Multi-Party talks opened on 10 June 1996. The talks were chaired by Senator Mitchell and involved the Irish and British Governments, and the parties elected in Northern Ireland the previous month. Sinn Féin was excluded until 1997, when the IRA announced a further ceasefire.
While most of the main political parties in Northern Ireland were supportive of the talks process and the Agreement, the Democratic Unionist Party opposed it, and subsequently campaigned against it.
Also included in the negotiations was the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, an all-women, cross-community group who had lobbied to allow representatives of women’s voices to be included in the peace talks. The NIWC secured two seats at the Multi-Party talks.
External, independent observers were involved in the negotiations to act as neutral arbiters and instil a sense of trust during the process. US President Clinton took a keen interest in the negotiations and helped create momentum towards agreement, including high-profile visits in 1995 and 1998.
Public Opinion 7 April 1997:
The Belfast Telegraph published…results of an opinion survey it conducted in collaboration with Queens University. Survey questions were developed in cooperation with the ten leading parties in Northern Ireland.
In the survey, 93 per cent of Protestants and 97 per cent of Catholics said they “support the principle of a negotiated settlement for the political future of Northern Ireland,” but only 25 per cent of Protestants and 28 per cent of Catholics believed the “Talks” would lead to a settlement.
For almost two years, these representatives negotiated on the issues obstructing peace in Northern Ireland, seeking compromises on issues where many had diametrically opposing views. In an effort to overcome the political gridlock, Senator George Mitchell set the deadline for agreement of 9 April 1998. This led to intense negotiations, with party delegations and government officials working round the clock to find common ground. The initial midnight deadline of 9 April was not achieved, but parties and governments, including Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, stayed at Stormont Castle until an agreement was reached the following morning.
On the late afternoon of 10 April – Good Friday – and after 700 days of negotiations, it was announced that the Agreement was reached. All parties involved in the talks attended the final plenary session, during which George Mitchell made the formal announcement and concluded the multi-party talks, bringing an end to decades of violence in Northern Ireland.
The British-Irish Agreement, the treaty between Ireland and the UK that makes the Good Friday Agreement binding under international law, was also signed on 10 April 1998.
– – – – – – – – – –
and note: Bringing in the radicals :
The coalition helped to secure the agreement by winning the confidence of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups, said McWilliams. “We knew that leaving people out in the cold would cost us all a lot. Now we know the value added that women bring to the table.”
Bríd Rodgers, who was part of the talks, has said: “Mo Mowlam was absolutely brilliant. “She connected with ordinary people. She got the trust of the paramilitaries, she went into the Maze [prison]. She had a human touch and didn’t stand on ceremony. I’ve never met a politician like her. She was instrumental in setting an ambience that was conducive to reaching agreement. I don’t think her role was recognised at the time.”
Bringing in “the centre”, the “people” majority:
REFERENDUM VOTES in Northern Ireland and Ireland
On 22 May 1998, the Agreement was put to the people in two referenda, both North and South of the border.
The people of the island of Ireland, North and South, voted to resoundingly endorse the Good Friday Agreement, with majorities of 71% and 94% voting “Yes” respectively. This overwhelming democratic endorsement of the Agreement guarantees its enduring legitimacy and means that it belongs to the people of this island in a unique way.
The Agreement in Action
The terms of the Agreement included both the aspirational ideals of political partnership and the practical vehicles for cooperation, in order to recognize the parties” diverse but equally legitimate aspirations for the future of the island. The Agreement began with a Declaration of Support, affirming the negotiators” commitment to the values of partnership, equality, and mutual respect. “We reaffirm our total and absolute commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of resolving differences on political issues, and our opposition to any use or threat of force by other others for any political purpose.”
The first section of the Agreement addresses constitutional issues. The Agreement recognizes the complexity of people’s identities, acknowledging the right of the people living in Northern Ireland to identify as “Irish, British, or both”. It affirms the right of the people living on the island of Ireland to determine for themselves the possibility of a united Ireland, committing the UK Secretary of State to hold a poll if it “appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the UK and form part of a united Ireland”.
The Agreement also outlined the “three-stranded approach”, reflecting the totality of relationships across these islands and their mutually-interdependent nature: within Northern Ireland, North-South, and East-West. A number of power-sharing institutions were proposed, each with a specific mandate to maintain peace, and encourage dialogue and co-operation. The Good Friday Agreement considers other matters relating to the maintenance of peace and stability in Northern Ireland, including the promotion of human rights, the review of policing and justice arrangements, the decommissioning process, and acknowledging the legacy of the past.
Directly after the approval of the Agreement, work began to ensure the total and verifiable decommissioning of all paramilitary groups. The future President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, and former President of Finland, Martti Ahtissari, performed the critical task of monitoring the disarmament efforts of the paramilitary organizations, a crucial step in fostering confidence in the Agreement.
The Strands of the Good Friday Agreement
There are three strands of relationships central to the Good Friday Agreement.
Strand 1: Within Northern Ireland
Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland
The first of the Strands concerns with the establishment of democratic institutions in Northern Ireland, outlining the responsibilities and necessary safeguards to ensure the effective functioning of these institutions.
“This Agreement provides for a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.”
Assembly was originally made up of 108 members, with a reduction to 90 members from the 2017 Assembly election onwards, who are required to register a “designation of identity – nationalist, unionist or other” in order to measure whether there is cross-community support for key decisions.
The executive authority of the Assembly is held by the office of the First Minister, deputy First Minister, and up to ten Ministers who have responsibilities for specific Departments. The First Minister and deputy First Minister are the leaders of the largest nationalist and unionist parties to ensure cross-community representation and co-operation at the highest level of decision-making. Both positions share equal responsibility within government and make their decisions jointly.
The Assembly also holds the responsibility of passing legislation for Northern Ireland in areas of devolved responsibility and co-ordination with the Government of the United Kingdom on national policy matters.
Since 1998, the institutions outlined in Strand 1 of the Agreement have periodically not been in operation. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, efforts have continued to restore the Executive in a spirit of compromise and collaboration.
Strand 2: North-South dimension –
The Good Friday Agreement deals with the North/South Ministerial Council.
The purpose of the Council is to “bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government” in order to “exchange information, discuss and consult with a view to co-operation on matters of mutual interest”.
The Council meets twice a year when the Executive is in operation and all decisions are made in agreement by both administrations. Irish Government is led by the Taoiseach, and Northern Ireland representation is led by the First Minister and deputy First Minister. Engagements regarding sector-specific matters are represented by the appropriate Minister from both administrations.
The second strand also highlights the need for co-operation through implementation bodies on at least six matters. This can occur through co-operation of bodies already in existence in separate jurisdictions or the establishment of agreed implementation bodies working on a cross-border or all-island basis.
The North/South Ministerial Council and Northern Ireland Executive are “mutually interdependent, and that one cannot successfully function without the other”, reinforcing the interlocking nature of the three relationships.
Strand 3: East-West relations.
The third Strand of the Good Friday Agreement is concerned with maintaining the East-West dimension of relationships. The Governments of Ireland and of the United Kingdom are co-guarantors of the Agreement.
British-Irish Council
The Agreement called for the establishment of a British-Irish Council (BIC), comprising of representatives of the British and Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales as well as the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands.
The purpose of the BIC is to “exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach agreement on co-operation on matters of mutual interest”. These matters could include transport links, agricultural, environmental, cultural, health, education and EU issues.
The BIC meets twice a year at summit-level, with the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister in attendance. The BIC convenes for specific sectoral or cross-sectoral matters, with the appropriate Ministers for both jurisdictions in attendance.
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference
The Agreement called for the establishment of a standing British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC), replacing the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference established under Article 2 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.
The Agreement stipulated for regular and frequent meetings of the Conference to “promote bilateral co-operation at all levels” on all-island or cross-border matters. The Government of Ireland also can put forward views and proposals, in recognition of our “special interest in Northern Ireland and extent to which issues of mutual concern arise”.
Reflections on the Good Friday Agreement – by Clem McCartney
from A Supplement to “Striking a balance” (update 2003)
This is an update to Accord issue 8, Striking a balance: The Northern Ireland peace process. The original publication explores the factors that led to the 1998 Belfast Agreement and outlines the impact of history on current aspirations. It was updated in print and online in 2003 to include a new article by Clem McCartney – “Suspending judgement – the politics of peacebuilding in Northern Ireland” – that highlights weaknesses in the agreement, including the challenge posed by issues such as decommissioning.
McCarty analyses the negative effects of an elite bargaining process on the outstanding issues and argues that a new culture of cooperative politics is required to embed the peace process.”
– “Conciliation Resources”
Selected quotes from Clem McCartney’s article:
“Perhaps the greatest achievement of the peace process is that there are few people who would welcome a return to violence. In many ways the peace process was a sign that most paramilitary organizations had accepted that they could not achieve their goals by a military campaign and they were prepared to see if a negotiated settlement could offer a better outcome. Many paramilitary leaders said that they did not want the violence to continue into the next generation.”
…Ironically street violence has increased and there has been much more overt tension at the interfaces between opposing communities, as though they were testing who had won and who had lost.
Moving to a post conflict culture
There is a good deal of talk about the need for trust and confidence-building by the other side because they are seen as untrustworthy but little awareness that one’s own defensive behaviour does not inspire trust. So each party acts in ways which reinforce the image that their opponent holds of them and as a result the opponents respond in way which reinforce the stereotype.
…for over five years they have taken risks to keep the Agreement alive. However they have not taken fulfil the risk of a new form of co-operative politics where they try to create a shared analysis of the problems and show mutual generosity.
The Civic Forum stands alongside the constitutional process and deals mainly with social issues…It has been mainly left to the voluntary sector… to attempt to initiate a serious debate about developing some process of understanding the pst and dealing with the hurts and mistrust that now exist and inhibit reconciliation.
Under the chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell it was clear that the responsibility for the future arrangements lay in the hands of the Northern Irish parties. He would not find a solution for them and he could not impose a solution on them.
However towards the end of the Stormont negotiations, and subsequently, a new geography emerged. The British Prime Minister became more directly involved and the Northern Irish parties found it more congenial and more effective to go directly to him to lobby on their demands. The result is that the parties met less frequently. They did not have to hammer out a common understanding of the issues and a mutually acceptable outcome. Instead they began to use the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) as arbitrators who would be able to bring the opposing parties round to their positions. This they did after each problem but such mutual acceptance became harder to achieve as each agreement did not deal with the fundamental concerns which had caused the problem in the first place.
The case for an inclusive process was argued, especially by the Women’s Coalition and the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP). It was becoming an elite process with emphasis on two parties (UUP and Sinn Fein) and the two individual leaders of those parties, David Trimble and Gerry Adams.) They effectively had a veto over thee process because their withdrawal would destroy the concept of participations by both communities which was a cornerstone of the Agreement. At the same time they were seen as people who could deliver those communities.
The Good Friday Agreement today
The Good Friday Agreement transformed what we thought was possible and what we could hope for in the future. It transformed relationships at every level across these islands.
Significant progress on peace and reconciliation has been made in since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in Stormont Castle. Today, an entire generation on the island of Ireland has lived out of the shadow of violence as a result of the Agreement.
The years since the signing have had their challenges. They have seen failure as well as success. At each moment of difficulty, the only viable solution has always been to come together once again to find an agreed way forward and return to the institutions created by the Good Friday Agreement. Our shared commitment to exclusively democratic and peaceful means of addressing these challenges remains.
Since the conclusion of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998,
It has been necessary to pursue a series of successive further political and legal agreements to consolidate the peace settlement, including:
the Saint Andrews Agreement (2006),
the Hillsborough Agreement (2010),
the Stormont House Agreement (2014),
the Fresh Start Agreement (2015), and
New Decade New Approach (2020).
The impact of the Troubles and the legacy of violence can still be felt today. Much work remains in order to truly fulfil the vision and values of the Agreement. The Government of Ireland is committed to implementing the Agreement in its totality to ensure that all communities and traditions can fully reap the benefits of peace.
Northern Ireland has changed profoundly since the Agreement, but the appetite for a peaceful, prosperous future has not. The Good Friday Agreement remains the foundation for a hopeful future as we look to what the current generation of young leaders and peacebuilders will achieve in the years to come.
“We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicated ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.”
- Good Friday Agreement, 1998
